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Unconscionability and the Fundamental Breach
Doctrine in Computer Contracts
Small businesses are responsible for much of the increased de-
mand that has tripled the market for minicomputers and microcom-
puters since 1975.1 A suitable and properly functioning computer
system 2 can improve a small business's efficiency and profits.3 A mal-
functioning computer system, or one not suited to the business's
needs, however, can severely damage or destroy a small business.4 A
vast increase in the amount of computer litigation5 has accompanied
the increase in computer sales.6 The common complaint of small
business litigants is that their new computer system does not perform
as expected.7
Computer litigation has strained the traditional legal theories
that evolved in a computerless society.8 Litigation involving com-
puter systems requires a new analysis because the traditional legal
theories of fraud and breach of warranty, as courts presently apply
them, ignore the inherent differences between computers and ordi-
nary business equipment.9 Many small businessmen who have relied
on vendors to provide them with a suitable system thus find them-
I Ackland, Suits S'gnifi Computer Growing Pains, Chicago Tribune, May 3, 1981, § 5 (Sun-
day Business) at 2, col. 5 [hereinafter cited as Ackland].
2 A "computer system" includes the hardware and software necessary to perform elec-
tronic data processing. Telex v. IBM, 4 C.L.S.R. 275, 293 (N.D. Okla. 1973). See also Smith, A
Survq of Current Legal Issues Arising From Contracts For Computer Goods and Services, 1 CoMP. L.J.
475, 477 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Smith].
3 Ackland, supra note 1, at 1, col. 1.
4 See Touhy & Shapiro, Suits Say Small Computers Aren't What Thqre Cracked Up To Be, 3
CHicAGo LAw., Dec. 1980, at 4, Col. 4 [hereinafter cited as Touhy & Shapiro].
5 Computer litigation refers to litigation between parties to an agreement for the
purchase or lease of a computer system.
6 See Touhy & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 6, col. 3 (predicting 5,000 suits in next ten years);
Ackland, supra note 1, at 1, col. 1 (presently "at least 600 cases nationwide").
7 Touhy & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 4, col. 1. See, e.g., Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. NCR
Corp., 635 F.2d 1081, 1083 (3d Cir. 1980); Earman Oil Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 625 F.2d
1291, 1293 (5th Cir. 1980); Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737, 739
(2d Cir. 1979); Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169, 174 (8th Cir.
1971); Garden State Food Dist. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 512 F. Supp. 975 (D.NJ. 1981); Carl
Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 361 F. Supp. 325, 327 (E.D. Pa. 1973), afdmm, 493
F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1974); Burroughs Corp. v. Chesapeake Petroleum & Supply Co., Inc., 282
Md. 406, 407, 384 A.2d 734, 735 (1978).
8 Moorhead, Limiting Liabiliy in Electronic Data Processing Service Contracts, 4 RUTGERS J.
CoMP. & LAw 141, 141 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Moorhead].
9 See text accompanying notes 48-61 infra.
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selves with a computer that does not suit their needs and with no
legal recourse.
This note initially discusses the problems plaintiffs encounter
when trying to recover for fraud or breach of warranty in computer
litigation. Part two examines the unconscionability doctrine as
courts now apply it to computer contracts. Part three urges courts to
use the fundamental breach analysis in applying unconscionability to
computer contracts. Finally, this note investigates the support for
applying a fundamental breach analysis found in the Uniform Com-
mercial Code.
I. Recovery for Fraud or Breach of Warranty
Courts draw a very fine line between misunderstanding and mis-
representation in computer litigation. Plaintiffs alleging fraud have
thus met with little success. In Chatlos Sstems, Inc. v. NCR Corp. ,10 the
defendant represented that the computer system was a good invest-
ment, that it would solve inventory problems, that it would save la-
bor costs, and that it would be "up and running" within six
months.' 1 Although NCR failed to fulfill any of these promises, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the
district court's conclusion that NCR's representations were "overly
optimistic, not fraudulent."' 2
In Wes6eld Chemical Corp. v. Burroughs Corp. ,'13 the defendant rep-
resented that the computer would generate efficiency and time sav-
ings and that it suited the plaintiffs accounting system.14 When the
computer failed to perform as represented, the plaintiff alleged fraud.
The court dismissed the fraud claim stating: "[a]ny alleged misrepre-
sentation concerning the function of the computer related to future
performances not susceptible of actual knowledge and cannot serve
as a basis for recovery in fraud.' 5
Generally, computer contracts fall within the scope of Uniform
10 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980).
11 Id at 1083.
12 Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. NCR Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738, 749 (D.N.J. 1979).
13 21 U.C.C. Rep. 1293, 6 C.L.S.R. 438 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1977).
14 Id at 1295, 6 C.L.S.R. at 439.
15 Id But see Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1971),
where the defendant represented that the proposed computer system would "constitute an
effective and efficient tool to be used in inventory control." Id at 181. Because the system
failed to work, the court concluded that the defendant was liable for fraud. Id at 186. Under
Minnesota state law, as applied in Clements, however, scienter is not an element necessary to
recover for fraud.
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Commercial Code (U.C.C.) Article Two on sales. 16 In disputes aris-
ing about the fitness or suitability of a computer system, sections 2-
313, 2-314, 2-315, dealing with express and implied warranties,
should provide the small businessman with sufficient protection.17
Courts, however, have routinely enforced clauses commonly con-
tained in computer contracts that limit the effect of the express and
implied warranties. For example, the defendant in Garden State Food
Distributors, Inc. v. Sperry Rand Corp. ,18 admitted that it had breached
various warranties, yet the court enforced a clause limiting Sperry's
liability and dismissed the plaintiff's damages claim.19
In Bakal v. Burroughs Corp. ,20 the plaintiff alleged breach of the
implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular
purpose.21 The court dismissed the claim ruling that the defendant
had successfully disclaimed all implied warranties. 22 Similarly, in
Badger Bearing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp. 23 the court found it "unneces-
sary to determine whether Burroughs violated any express or implied
warranty because .. .Burroughs effectively disclaimed all warran-
ties . .. "24
II. Unconscionability
Since computers are inherently different from ordinary business
equipment, 25 a proper issue in computer litigation is whether courts
should continue to routinely enforce exculpatory clauses. Under the
general principle of freedom of contract, a court should enforce an
exculpatory clause that the parties bargained for and made an inte-
16 See Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. NCR Corp., 635 F.2d 1081, 1084 (3d Cir. 1980); Earman
Oil Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 625 F.2d 1291, 1297 (5th Cir. 1980).
17 If a businessman can prove breach of warranty, he can then recover damages as de-
fined by U.C.C. § 2-714(2): The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference
at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value
they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show proxi-
mate damages of a different amount.
18 512 F. Supp. 975 (D.NJ. 1981).
19 Id at 978.
20 74 Misc. 2d 202, 343 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
21 Id at 203, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 543.
22 Id at 205, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 544-45.
23 444 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
24 Id at 922. See a/so Moorhead, supra note 8, at 141; Bigelow, Contract Caveats in 2 CoMP.
L. SERV. (CALL.) § 3-1 (1978). The Parol Evidence Rule is also a particularly strong tool for
a vendor, because a properly drafted integration clause can effectively exclude from the con-
tract promises made by a computer salesman during sales presentations. Smith, supra note 2,
at 485. Since the user cannot prove an express warranty, he cannot recover for breach of an
express warranty.
25 See text accompanying notes 48-61 infra.
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gral part of the contract. If, however, the exculpatory clause is un-
conscionable, or "contrary to the essential purpose of the
agreement," 26 a court should "so limit the application of [the] uncon-
scionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result. '27
A. Majority View
In computer litigation, the majority of courts have looked to the
parties' relative commercial sophistication in deciding whether excul-
patory clauses are unconscionable. The court in Bakal found "noth-
ing unconscionable as far as the agreement between [the] parties, ' 28
since the clause limiting liability was common to commercial agree-
ments and since "limitation of damages where the loss is commercial
is not [unconscionable]. '29 In Badger, the court upheld a clause dis-
claiming warranties after ruling that the failure to timely raise the
unconscionability issue precluded an inquiry into it.30 The court,
however, then stated that the disclaimer clause was not unconsciona-
ble. "Although the plaintiff was less knowledgeable about computers
than the defendant, as a businessman he must be deemed to possess
some commercial sophistication and familiarity with disclaimers."'3
B. Minority View
Instead of focusing on the parties' relative commercial sophisti-
cation, a minority of courts have looked to the parties' relative com-
puter sophistication. In Chatlos Systen, Inc. v. NCR Cop. ,32 for
instance, the Third Circuit found "no great disparity in the parties'
bargaining power or sophistication ' 33 since the plaintiff was "a man-
ufacturer of complex electronic equipment, [and] had some apprecia-
tion of the problems that might be encountered with a computer
system."' 34 Only after determining that the parties were of relatively
equal computer sophistication did the court uphold a clause limiting
NCR's liability for breach of warranty.
A California district court in Glovatorium, Inc. v. NCR Corp. 35 also
26 U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 2.
27 U.C.C. § 2-302(1).
28 74 Misc. 2d 202, 205, 343 N.Y.S.2d 541, 544 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
29 Id at 204, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 544.
30 444 F. Supp. 919, 923 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
31 Id
32 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980).
33 Id at 1087.
34 Id
35 Glovatorium, Inc. v. NCR Corp., C-79-3393 (N.D. Cal., May 1, 1981) Reporter's
Transcript of Proceedings.
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examined the parties' relative computer sophistication, but refused to
uphold a limitation of liability clause stating:
[I]f there was ever a case of unconscionability, this is the classic
case. The very idea of marketing this product was to - it was
targeted at the first-time computer user, that is people who didn't
know - not only didn't know anything about computers, but had
no experience with them, and didn't know what the consequences
would be of an inadequate product. . . . NCR was under a special
obligation in dealing with the first-time computer user .... 36
The question, therefore, is whether in computer litigation courts
should focus on the parties' relative commercial sophistication or on
their relative computer sophistication when deciding if an exculpa-
tory clause in a computer contract is unconscionable.37 Since an un-
conscionable clause is one that is "contrary to the essential purpose of
the agreement, ' 38 courts must first determine the contract's essential
purpose. Courts can make this determination by looking to the fun-
damental breach doctrine.
III. Fundamental Breach Analysis
A. Definition
The fundamental breach doctrine was developed chiefly by
post-war British courts.3 9 One commentator summarized the doc-
trine as follows:
Every contract contains a "core" or fundamental obligation which
must be performed. If one party fails to perform this fundamental
obligation, he will be guilty of a breach of the contract whether or
not any exempting clause has been inserted which purports to pro-
tect him.4°
36 Id at 4. Cf Burroughs Corp. v. Chesapeake Petroleum & Supply Co., 282 Md. 406,
384 A.2d 734 (1978) (did not reach trial court ruling that an exculpatory clause was
unconscionable).
37 The question of commercial versus computer sophistication is important because a
businessman "must be deemed to possess some commercial sophistication and familiarity with
disclaimers." Badger, 444 F. Supp. at 923 (E.D. Wis. 1977). A court focusing on the parties'
relative commercial sophistication, therefore, is less likely to deem unconscionable an excul-
patory clause in a computer contract. Since few businessmen are familiar with computers,
however, a court focusing on the parties' relative computer sophistication is more likely to
find unconscionable an exculpatory clause in a computer contract.
38 U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 2.
39 Ellinghaus, In Doefense of Unconsdonability, 78 YALE L.J. 757, 797 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Ellinghaus].
40 Guest, Fundamental Breach of Contract, 77 L.Q. REv. 98, 99 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
Guest]. For a more recent general discussion of the doctrine, see Dawson, Fundamental Breach of
Contract, 91 L.Q. REv. 380 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Dawson].
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Great Britain's Court of Appeal made this doctrine law in Kar-
sales (Harrow) Ltd v. Wallis. 4' In this case, the defendant inspected a
used car and agreed to purchase it on conditional sale.42 Upon deliv-
ery, the defendant discovered that the car was totally inoperable.43
The plaintiff argued that the defendant was still liable for the
purchase price because of a contractual disclaimer stating that "[n]o
condition or warranty that the vehicle is roadworthy, or as to its age,
condition or fitness for any purpose is given by the owner or implied
herein." 44 The court, however, ruled that the vendor breached a fun-
damental obligation by failing to deliver a car that "would go."'45
The court thus rejected the vendor's claim for payment based on the
exculpatory clause.46
B. Fundamental Obligation
Karsales' "fundamental obligation" is the same as the U.C.C.'s
"essential purpose. '47 Thus, to deduce a computer contract's essen-
tial purpose, a court should determine the parties' fundamental obli-
gations.48  The vendor's fundamental obligation in an ordinary
computer contract is to provide a system that operates properly and
is suitable to the user's needs. This fundamental obligation stems
from the nature of both the computer and the negotiation process,
and the user's reliance on the vendor.
1. Nature of the Computer
A computer differs inherently from ordinary business equipment
because of its extremely complex operations. Consisting of the hard-
41 [1956] 1 W.L.R. 936.
42 Id at 937.
43 Id at 938.
44 Id at 937-38.
45 Id at 941.
46 Id After the House of Lords' decision in Suisse Atlantique Soci&t D'Armement Mari-
time S.A. v. N.V. Totterdamsche Kolen Centrale, [1967] 1 A.C. 361, there was considerable
dispute as to whether the fundamental breach doctrine was anything more than a mere rule
of construction. Subsequent developments in English law, however, indicate that the doc-
trine remains a viable principle of substantive law. For a detailed analysis of these develop-
ments, see Dawson, supra note 40. See also Fundamental Breach Reappraised- 1, 114 SOLIcrrOR'S
J. 610 (1970).
47 See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 368-69 (1960), and Ellinghaus,
supra note 39, at 797.
48 See generaly Guest, supra note 40; Meyer, Contracts of Adhesion and the Doctyine ofFundamen-
talBreach, 50 VA. L. REV. 1178 (1964).
[February 1982]
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ware and software 49 necessary to perform electronic data process-
ing,50 a computer system operates without human intervention and
performs a large number of consecutive and complicated functions
while evaluating its own performance. 51 This capability enables a
computer system, unlike ordinary business equipment, to take over
and control large segments of a business's operations. 52
Although a businessman need not understand the internal com-
plexities of a computer system before using one,53 his problems begin
when he neither appreciates the computer system's addictive power
nor foresees how vulnerable his business will become once computer-
ized. "Many computer systems have the unique quality of quickly
and more completely becoming an integral part of their user's opera-
tion than almost any other technology. So quickly, in fact, that one
can become dependent upon [an ordered] system . . . . long before it
commences operation. ' 54 When a small business converts to a com-
puter system, its "very survival as a business is tied to the perform-
ance and reliability of the [system] . . ., and to the capacity and
willingness of the manufacturer to stand behind it and provide the
necessary support. '55
Carl Beasly Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp. 56 illustrates the problems
a small businessman can encounter with a new computer system. In
Beasley, the plaintiff purchased a computer system to produce ac-
counting records for submission to Ford Motor Company under its
car dealership franchise agreement.5 7 Upon delivery of the system,
the vendor instructed the plaintiff to discontinue his reliance on
outside accountants. 58 Because the computer system failed to oper-
49 Hardware is a computer's tangible components and software consists of the computer
programming. See Smith, supra note 2, at 476 n.5 & 9.
50 "Electronic data processing (EDP) is the conversion of words, letters, numbers, or com-
binations of words, letters and numbers, or other types of data, into electronic signals; the
data is then collected, stored, sorted, analyzed, compared or computed." Telex v. IBM, 4
C.L.S.R. 275, 293, (N.D. Okla. 1973). The computer times transmissions in billionths of
seconds (nanoseconds) and measures storage capacity (memory) by millions of combinations
of information bits (megabytes). Id at 283. The computer separately but simultaneously
works on and instantly solves numerous problems involving logic or arithmetic functions. Id
51 Id. at 294.
52 See Freed, Negotiating for a Computer Without Negotiating Trouble, in 2 COMP. L. SERV.
(CALL.) § 3-2, at 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Freed].
53 See C. TAPPER, COMPUTER LAw 44 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TAPPER].
54 Freed, supra, note 51, at 1; see also TAPPER, supra note 53, at 42-44.
55 Glovatorium v. NCR Corp. (N.D. Cal., May 1, 1981) Reporter's Transcript of Pro-
ceedings 24.
56 361 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1973), a.fdmem, 493 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1974).
57 361 F. Supp. at 329.
58 Id at 328.
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ate satisfactorily, the plaintiff had to rehire the outside accountants
to reconstruct an entire year's accounting records.5 9
Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc. ro presents a more dra-
matic example of the problems a small business can have with a de-
fective computer system. Honeywell employees attempted
unsuccessfully for more than a year to make the system operational,61
but the computer system's incorrect billings and improper payments
eventually forced Triangle out of business.62
2. Negotiation Process
The acquisition of a computer system thus exposes a business to
substantially more risks than does the acquisition of ordinary busi-
ness equipment. Since "[t]he parties too often bring to the negotia-
tions too dissimilar a background of competence and knowledge," 63
the businessman cannot comprehend these risks; therefore, the busi-
nessman is at a distinct disadvantage when negotiating with the ven-
dor. In Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp. 64 the Eighth Circuit
took judicial notice of the inequality of knowledge between the ven-
dor and the small businessman. 65 The court recognized that the de-
fendant "was clearly the expert in the computer field and must be
held responsible for superior knowledge in that field."' 66
Hiring a computer analyst will not necessarily solve the problem
caused by the small businessman's lack of knowledge. Even if a small
businessman can afford to hire an analyst, he may still be at a disad-
vantage if the analyst can communicate no better with the business-
man than can the vendor. One district court recognized that the
problem lies in the nature of the computer business and not necessar-
ily with the people involved:
[I]n the computer age, lawyers and courts need no longer feel
ashamed or even sensitive about the charge, often made, that they
confuse the issue by resort to legal "jargon," law Latin or Norman
French. By comparison, the misnomers and industrial shorthand of
the computer world make the most esoteric legal writing seem as
clear and lucid as the Ten Commandments or the Gettysburg Ad-
dress; and to add to this Babel, the experts in the computer field,
59 Id at 329.
60 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979).
61 Id at 740.
62 Se Touhy & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 4, col. 4.
63 TAPPER, supra note 53, at 44.
64 444 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1971).
65 Id at 183.
66 Id
while using exactly the same words, uniformly disagree as to pre-
cisely what they mean ...
[A computer's] components are myriad, each identified by a
separate English word whose meaning in the industry is wholly un-
related to that contained in the dictionary.67
To add to the language barrier, negotiations for the acquisition
of a small business computer system can extend for months or even
years.68 The technology available at the completion of negotiations
may be quite different from what was available or promised at the
beginning of the negotiations. 69 The vendor again has the advantage
because he is in the best position to know what technology is avail-
able and when it will be available.
3. Reliance
The typical small businessman, unlike the vendor, does not have
the requisite expertise to judge whether a computer system operates
properly and suits his needs.70 As a result, most small businessmen
rely heavily on vendors while negotiating for the acquisition of a
computer system.7' U.C.C. section 2-315 is particularly relevant to
such situations:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the
buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish
suitable goods, there is . . . an implied warranty that the goods
shall be fit for such purpose. 72
Computer contract negotiations strengthen the small business-
man's expectations of receiving a system fit for a particular purpose.
Not only does the vendor have "reason to know" of the user's partic-
ular purpose, but often the vendor will actually have formulated that
particular purpose.73 Furthermore, the vendor knows that the user is
relying on the vendor's skill or judgment, and may have even solic-
ited that reliance.74 From the small businessman's standpoint, there-
67 Honeywell, Inc. v. Lithonia Lighting, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 406, 408 (N.D. Ga. 1970). Se
a/ro TAPPER, supra note 53, at 44.
68 Smith, supra note 2, at 485.
69 See United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966).
70 See Moorhead, supra note 8, at 142; TAPPER, supra note 53, at 44.
71 See TAPPER, supra note 53, at 44; Smith, supira note 2, at 478.
72 U.C.C. § 2-315.
73 See TAPPER, supra note 53, at 44; Lovely v. Burroughs Corp., 527 P.2d 557, 560 (Mont.
1974); Bakal v. Burroughs Corp., 74 Misc. 2d 202,203,343 N.Y.S.2d 541,542 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
74 See, e.g., P.U.C. of Waterloo v. Burroughs Business Mach., Ltd., 52 D.L.R.3d 481, 484
(Ont. C.A. 1974).
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fore, the very essence of the computer contract is to receive a
computer system that is operable and suitable to his needs. 75
Several Canadian courts have applied the fundamental breach
doctrine in computer litigation upon determining that the user's reli-
ance and reasonable expectations imposed a fundamental obligation
on the vendor. In Burroughs Business Machines, Ltd v. Feed-Rite Mils
(1962), Ltd ,76 the vendor recommended the purchase of a specific
Burroughs' system. The vendor assured the purchaser that the sys-
tem would meet its needs and perform its entire accounting func-
tions. 77 Almost a year after installation, the system still failed to
operate satisfactorily and many programs remained unwritten.78 Af-
ter Feed-Rite asked Burroughs to remove the system and cancel the
contract, Burroughs sued to recover the balance of the purchase
price.79 The court, however, ruled that Burroughs had breached a
fundamental obligation:
Feed-Rite purchased a computer to do its complete accounting.
Due to defects in the equipment and the failure of plaintiff to fully
programme the unit there was a breach of the contract of such se-
verity that it went to the root of the matter. The defendant was
deprived of the whole benefit it was intended to obtain from the
contract.8 0
In P. U. C of Waterloo v. Burroughs Business Machines, Ltd ,81 the
trial court found that the computer system could not do the work the
plaintiff had specified. The court stated that the vendor bore the
responsibility "to see to it that the programming was right and that
the hardware would process the programmes efficiently. '8 2 Since the
computer could not perform the work specified, it did not suit the
purposes for which the plaintiff had ordered it;83 hence, the vendor
75 The parties often have differing perceptions of exactly what the contract obliges the
vendor to deliver. See Lovable Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 431 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1970), in which
the court viewed the contract from the vendor's perspective and agreed that Honeywell was
obliged merely to furnish the equipment and keep it running. The dissenting judge, however,
in viewing the contract from the user's perspective, urged: "I simply cannot conceive of two
capable businessmen negotiating for the sale or lease of a computer system except on the basis
of what it would do. Ultimately this is what Honeywell was selling and this is what Lovable
thought it would get." Id at 677. See generally note 7 supra.
76 42 D.L.R.3d 303 (Man. C.A. 1973), af'dmem., 64 D.L.R.3d 767 (Can. 1976).
77 Id at 304-05.
78 Id
79 Id
80 Id at 307.
81 [1973] 2 O.R. 472, 34 D.L.R.3d 320 (1973), affd, 52 D.L.R.3d 481 (Ont. C.A. 1974).
82 34 D.L.R.3d at 325.
83 52 D.L.R.3d at 488.
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committed a fundamental breach of the contract.8 4
A computer contract's essential purpose is for the vendor to de-
liver to the buyer an operable and suitable computer system. A
clause that allows the vendor to deliver anything less without liability
for breach of warranty defeats the essential purpose of the contract,
and is thus unconscionable. 85 An exclusionary clause is not uncon-
scionable, however, if the parties freely and knowingly bargained for
its inclusion. A court can determine if the parties freely and know-
ingly bargained for the clause only by examining their relative com-
puter sophistication. If the small businessman has little or no
appreciation for the consequences of an inadequate system, then he
could not have freely consented to an exculpatory clause that releases
the vendor from liability for delivering an inoperable or unsuitable
system.
IV. U.C.C. Support for Fundamental Breach Analysis
Using a fundamental breach analysis to decide whether exculpa-
tory clauses are unconscionable would expand the present applica-
tion of U.C.C. section 2-302. However, even though no United
States court has explicitly adopted the fundamental breach doc-
trine,86 elements of the doctrine can be found throughout Article
Two of the U.C.G.
84 Id at 489 ("What occurred in the case at bar was also a fundamental breach of con-
tract . . 2).
85 S e U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 2.
86 Federal courts have applied a limited version of the fundamental breach doctrine in
actions against common carriers. The Second Circuit has labeled this doctrine the "quasi-
deviation rule." The doctrine provides that if the carrier deviates substantially from the con-
tracted-for voyage or stowage, it cannot rely on clauses limiting its liability. See Elgie & Co. v.
S.S. "S.A. Nederburg", 599 F.2d 1177 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1072 (1980); accord,
Searoad Shipping Co. v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 361 F.2d 833 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 973 (1966) (carrier liable for full value of lost cargo when bill of lading called for
below deck stowage and carrier actually carried the goods above deck).
State courts have also applied a version of the fundamental breach doctrine. In Philco
Corp. v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 18 Mich. App. 206, 171 N.W.2d 16 (1969), an action against
an air carrier for materially deviating from the carriage contract, the court observed:
To uphold the carrier's contention that the limitation of liability is absolute, re-
gardless of a fundamental breach which goes to the very essence of its undertaking,
would permit any carrier to violate with recklessness the terms of the bill of lading
knowing it cannot be called upon to pay more than 50 cents per pound.
Id at 224, 171 N.W.2d at 24-25.
Accord, Information Control Corp. v. United Airlines, 73 Cal.App.3d 630, 641, 140
Cal.Rptr. 877, 844 (1977) (explicitly adopting the Philco rationale to hold a carrier liable
when its material deviation from the stowage contract caused damage to the goods); Cassidy
v. Airborne Freight Corp., 565 P.2d 360, 362 (Okla. 1977) ("[i]f a carrier commits a breach of
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Section 1-102(3)87 permits consenting parties to alter, limit, or
exclude contractual duties, yet it prohibits those parties from altering
or excluding certain fundamental obligations. Section 1-203 imposes
on all transactions a good faith obligation which under section 1-
102(3) cannot be disclaimed. Vases v. Montgomety Ward & Co. 88 illus-
trates how good faith is, in effect, a fundamental obligation. The
Third Circuit in Vases held that a warranty disclaimer clause would
violate the duty of good faith if it relieved the seller of liability for
selling worthless goods.89
The Official Comment to U.C.C. Section 2-313 indicates that
express warranties are also fundamental obligations. Because express
warranties define "the essence of [the] bargain," 9 disclaimer clauses
are repugnant and void.91 If the seller violates the warranty, he will,
in effect, "be guilty of a breach of the contract whether or not any
exempting clause has been inserted which purports to protect him. ' '92
Although the U.C.C. prohibits parties from disclaiming all lia-
bility for breach of contract, section 2-719(1) permits parties to limit
recoverable damages. 93 Section 2-719(2), however, imposes a funda-
mental obligation on the seller. The comment explicitly states that
"it is the very essence of a sales contract that at least minimum ade-
contract of affreightment which goes to the essence of the contract, it is not entitled after such
a breach to invoke provisions of the contract which are in its favor").
Cf In re Estate of Johnson, 202 Kan. 684, 693, 452 P.2d 286, 293 (1969) (refusing to
rescind antenuptial agreement because decedent's breach was not a "substantial or funda-
mental breach going to the very heart of the agreement').
For the present status of the fundamental breach doctrine in the United States, see Ferti-
lizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Ohio 1981). In IDI, an
arbitration panel had relied on the fundamental breach doctrine to award the plaintiff conse-
quential damages, though the parties' contract explicitly exempted the defendant from liabil-
ity for consequential damages. The defendant argued that the fundamental breach doctrine
was a "pet theory" of the arbitrators that had "not been accepted by anyone else." Id at 959.
The court, in upholding the arbitration award, rejected this contention and found that the
doctrine "is a viable theory of law, at least in the English system." Id The court further
stated that it was uncertain whether in the United States "a breach of contract found to be
material or 'fundamental' would abrogate an express clause limiting damages to those other
than consequential." Id
87 "The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement, except as otherwise
provided in this Act and except that the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness
and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by agreement...." U.C.C. § 1-
102(3).
88 377 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1967).
89 Id at 850.
90 U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 4.
91 Id, Comment 1.
92 Guest, supra note 40, at 99.
93 U.C.C. § 2-719.
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quate remedies be available."94 Upon the seller's breach of the fun-
damental obligation to provide adequate remedies, section 2-719(2)
permits the buyer to resort to any other remedies in the U.C.C. Be-
cause the U.C.C. prevents a seller from disclaiming all contractual
liability,95 it effectively requires the seller to perform the "essence" of
the contract and supply minimum adequate remedies. 96
Under the fundamental breach doctrine, failure to perform a
fundamental obligation prevents a party from invoking an exempt-
ing clause that would otherwise protect him. 97 U.C.C. section 2-302
concerning unconscionability gives to the courts the power to effect a
similar result:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the re-
mainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it
may so limit the application of the unconscionable clause as to
avoid any unconscionable result.98
The Official Comment to section 2-302 lists a number of English
and American cases which "illustrate" unconscionability. 99 An ex-
amination of these cases indicates that fundamental breach and un-
conscionability are, in fact, closely related. 10° In an early illustration
of the fundamental breach doctrine, Andrews Bros. Boumemouth, Ltd. v.
Singer & Co., Ltd , 10 the buyer purchased a new car but received a
used car instead. The court ruled that the term "new Singer car"
was an express term of the contract that the seller had breached. The
seller, therefore, could not avoid liability by claiming the protection
of an exculpatory clause.' 02
In Meyer v. Packard Motor Car Co. ,10o3 also cited in the Official
Comment, the plaintiff purchased a reconditioned truck that was un-
fit for "substantial service as a dump truck. °10 4 The court held that
94 Id, Comment 1 (emphasis added).
95 "If the parties intend to conclude a contract for sale within this Article they must
accept the legal consequences that there must be at least a fair quantum of remedy for breach
of the obligations or duties outlined in the contract." Id
96 See, e.g., Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. NCR Corp., 635 F.2d 1081, 1087 (3d Cir. 1980).
97 See Guest, sufira note 40, at 98.
98 U.C.C. § 2-302.
99 Id, Comment 1.
100 See Ellinghaus, supra note 39, at 798.
101 [1934] 1 K.B. 17.
102 Id at 17.
103 106 Ohio St. 328, 140 N.E. 118 (1922).
104 Id at 336, 140 N.E. at 120.
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an integration clause did not exclude an implied warranty. 10 5 Note
the Ohio Supreme Court's language:
The consideration to be given to Meyer for his $4200 was not
merely a shape of a 5-ton size, but a thing fitted for practical, use-
ful, substantial service as a dump truck.10 6
The Ohio Supreme Court in effect held that the vendor was obliged
to deliver the substance and not merely the form of what the buyer
expected.
In Austin Co. v. J.H Tillman Co. ,107 since "the machine delivered
failed in substantial and vital particulars to correspond with the
description in the contract,"'' 08 the court refused to uphold a clause
limiting remedies. 109 Again, the court was concerned that the buyer
receive the essence of that for which he bargained.
V. Conclusion
While the U.C.C. contains some of the elements of the funda-
mental breach doctrine, courts should not limit their analysis merely
to those elements. Section 1-103 provides that "the principles of law
and equity, including. . .[among other things, any] other validating
or invalidating cause shall supplement [the Code's] provisions."' 0
When applying section 2-302 on unconscionability, courts can look
beyond the U.C.C.'s present application. In computer litigation,
courts should use the closely related fundamental breach analysis
when applying section 2-302, thereby focusing their attention on the
parties' relative computer sophistication. Only by focusing on the
parties relative computer sophistication can a court accurately deter-
mine whether exculpatory clauses are unconscionable.
James B. Niehaus
105 Id at 328 headnote 2, 140 N.E. at 118.
106 Id at 336, 140 N.E. at 120.
107 104 Or. 541, 209 P. 131 (1922).
108 Id at 555, 209 P. at 135.
109 Id at 556, 209 P. at 135-36.
110 U.C.C. § 1-103(1).
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